missions, and missions from national security objectives."
2 The four phases of PPBE are very distinct but interrelated, each phase relies on the output of the preceding phases. The Constitution provides the authority for each player and stakeholder to execute their role in providing for national defense. This includes the responsibility to assess Army capabilities.
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The Planning phase is designed to identify the future strategic environment and forecast the capabilities needed for success. It is in this phase that the military's plan for forces to accomplish the numerous contingencies and national, defense, and military strategies is structured and articulated in terms of manning, training, supporting, sustaining, and maintaining requirements. It is also in the Planning phase that resources are allocated to requirements to achieve the national security objectives and priorities. 4 The Programming phase identifies gaps and redundancies in force capabilities as they pertain to the strategic environment and results in the allocation of constrained resources to achieve the best capability mix. It is during the Programming phase that allocations change from perceptions and assumptions to actual programs and take the form of tangible assets (i.e. dollars, materiel, and manpower). The Programming phase culminates with resource allocation decisions, which are the foundation of the budgeting phase. The Budgeting phase translates this resource allocation into budget terms to facilitate its justification for receipt of budget authority from Congress. It is during the Budget phase that program funding takes place and resources are adjusted based on execution feedback. 5 The Execution phase begins when the funds are appropriated and ends when the last dollar is spent. This phase is where resources are received in support of mission needs to provide requirements and capabilities to ensure the sustaining of the forces. It is here that the challenge becomes that of those who must execute and spend the funds more so than those managers who plan, program, and budget them.
Paramount to further discussion of this topic, it is important to define the termsinputs, outputs, outcomes. The inputs are the amount of funds provided to the specific command, agency, or organization-the end users, and the specific programs funded.
The outputs are how much is spent and on what.
The outcomes are what the dollars purchase. For the purposes of this paper the measure of effectiveness of a successful resource allocation process is whether or not the outcomes satisfy organizational needs in contrast to the percent of a requirement that is funded (input) or the percent of the budget that is spent (output).
This paper starts with a review of the evolution of PPBE and proceeds to a description of today's process and participants. This provides a background for a review and analysis of each phase of the process leading to the conclusion that outcomes should be the principal measures of merit of the process.
Resourcing the Force DoD Resource Reforms and Evolution
The DoD resource model has undergone an evolution since the inception of DoD in 1947. The early iteration of the budget process focused on budget estimates, which controlled actual expenditures, as totals of expenses (i.e. salaries, spare parts, or office supplies) but neglected to link them to missions or the functional structure within DoD.
This extremely decentralized system resulted in a resource formulation and allocation process, which offered individual solutions for each Service and addressed the issues one year at a time. Then mid-century the focus shifted from budget estimates to performance measures of effectiveness articulated in terms of what was purchased (quantity) and when (timeframe) such as functions, activities, and projects. The problem with this evolution was the processes remained disparate, unique to each Service;
therefore not necessarily supportive of the mission or plans of DoD. Further, there was no budget continuity from year to year, as leaders changed so did priorities, objectives and planned courses of action. 6 The next evolution of the resourcing system occurred in 1962. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was developed to provide efficiencies and improvements in resourcing through the establishment of long-range planning objectives and affordability projections. The system analyzed the cost and benefit alternatives of current and proposed programs to meet the stated objectives in strategic guidance, and translated high-priority programs into budgets, and legislative proposals.
PPBS provided the following capabilities and improvements: 1) it instituted a newly defined procedure that equitably distributed available resources among competing programs; 7 2) it assured system financial discipline and integrity; and 3) it developed effective programs to address existing and emerging needs, and established more stringent controls on the review and approval process. However, the DoD processes lacked a focus on execution and the ability to make PPBS a synchronous allencompassing financial resource system for strategic planning and needs identification (e.g. to address fulfilling military capabilities, develop and acquire systems, programs and budgets). 8 The problem with this process was that "the strategic planning process did not explicitly drive the identification of needs for military capabilities. Also, the The BES/BCP, as modified by the PBDs, is the baseline for the DoD budget, which becomes part of the President's Budget (PB) 32 submitted to Congress.
Budgeting has three distinct internal functions (i.e. formulation, justification, and execution), two of which are considered a part of the Budgeting phase of PPBE. The budget formulation and justification processes ensure costs and requirements are properly articulated and documented to defend Army resource decisions during budget reviews at all applicable levels. 33 OSD summarizes that the Budgeting phase (formulation and justification):
… provides a platform for a detailed review of a program's pricing, phasing, and overall capability to be executed on time and within budget. The budgeting process addresses the years to be justified in the President's Budget (including the current and upcoming execution years) and provides a forum to develop the Secretary's budget position.
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In the Army PPBE process, the Programming and Budgeting phases are integrated. The phase manager for the Programming phase is the DCofS, G-8 35 who in consonance with the Budgeting phase manager, the Army Budget Office (ABO) 36 strives to achieve a single seamless decision-making process. During these integrated phases programming guidance is issued by DCofS, G8 while formulation and execution guidance is issued by ABO to the Army community, which ensures compliance with OSD and OMB implementation guidance. ABO then disseminates the guidance to resolve any funding policy issues, and determines the impact COA revisions or strategy and policy changes might have on the process. In the second critique, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) says the planning or need identification process of PPBE is ineffective in that the DoD:
...approves proposed programs with much less consideration…commits to them earlier and with less knowledge of cost and feasibility…though the military fight jointly…although the military services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, they identify needs and allocate resources separately, using fragmented decision-making processes that do not allow for an integrated, portfolio management approach like that used by successful commercial companies. Consequently, DOD has less assurance that its investment decisions address the right mix of warfighting needs, and, …it starts more programs than current and likely future resources can support, a practice that has created a fiscal bow wave. If this trend goes unchecked, Congress will be faced with a difficult choice: pull dollars from other high-priority federal programs to fund DOD's acquisitions or accept gaps in warfighting capabilities. Need to Deflate the "ppb" in PPBE," identifies multiple criticisms, flaws and defects of the linear and rational PPBE process resident with non-PPBE supporters over the decades of its existence. He offers that a consideration of a more transformational view might be more appropriate in this VUCA environment. 44 Also, by inference, he asserts that execution, how the money is spent, needs to be accorded more importance in the process.
The above criticism articulates some of the perceived problems faced by DCofS, G-3/5/7 as it executes its full-spectrum planning responsibility to convert national, defense, and military guidance into Army warfighting capabilities as defined in the Army Campaign Plan. However, the coordination and planning done by the DCofS, G-3/5/7 ensures optimal resource allocation and Soldier benefit through multiple iterations of review and analysis on program requirements, both funded and unfunded through the 1-n 45 and integrated priority list (IPL) processes. 46 The Planning phase, though stagnant and inflexible in its methods, is the best we have and accomplishes the desired results to the extent national guidance, strategy and policy are representative of our strategic aims and the operational environment of the world and the state and non-state actors resident in it. Therefore, the project will not focus on recommendations for its improvement or the mapping of functions and operations of this phase to inputs, outputs, and outcomes.
Programming and Budgeting
Critics of PPBE offer specific problems, in the integrated programming and budgeting phase, which, in their opinions and based on studies and research, renders the process ineffective.
The first critique, the Aldridge Study, sees the problems as the DPG (as initially titled at the time of the study, since replaced by the SPG and JPG) requirements are unrealistic, and the process costs are exorbitant in time and decrements to inter-and intra-organizational relationships. He states that "jointness" is a costly after-thought which creates the probability of wasted resources due to overlaps, and filling joint capability gaps and inconsistencies is expensive. All of these result in problems during these phases. 47 GAO, the second critique, identified three process short-comings specific to PPBE programming and budgeting. First, GAO considered that the process was inflexible and unable to accommodate emerging unexpected requirements or technological improvements to programs or systems planned or previously programmed through the POM. Secondly, they thought the structure of these phases did not support joint operational needs and that though Defense thinking, planning, and organizing was joint, PPBE continues to resource in terms of the individual Services. Finally, GAO was concerned that the requirements and acquisition processes are not synchronized with PPBE, more specifically; requirements are defined as capabilities while the allocation process is designed to allocate by individual Service. 48 The third critique, made by Paparone, considers PPBE to possess a "central idea that objectivity can be verified and positive knowledge determined empirically…and that assumptions behind DoD strategic planning include a belief that predicting pathways to achieving goals will bring finality to solving problems." 49 Additional assumptions set-forth by Dr. Paparone's CGSC Silver Pen Award winning article are: programs spawn specific expectations, which blind managers to the true nature of things and cause focus on predictions; managers strive for stability through standardization versus ad hoc or reactionary actions resulting from current situations; and people locked to top-down guidance, strategy and policy, functioning within the system, tend to focus on predictions from models and past experience rather than on realities faced at the lowest levels.
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Paparone also talks about systems such as PPBE providing transient rather than permanent solutions to problems. In large measure, he felt it was due to the lead times required by the system and the resultant lack of actionable feedback from the end user of the resources. He considers that programming and budgeting phases exemplify hierarchical concepts of authority which DoD should decrease as it increases reliance on concepts of heterarchical (of more than one kind) leadership basing the process less on the who and where of the player in the hierarchy and more on the quality of the decision. The subtle inference here is leadership as opposed to authority drives attitudes and controls the operational tempo and who is allowed to play in decision making. PPBE viewed as a social climate or atmosphere conforms to the theory of planning set forth by Horst Rittel and Melvin Weber's article, "Dilemmas in a General
Theory of Planning," where they observe that, "social problems are never solved…at best they are only resolved-over and over again." The Programming phase is problematic because it is riddled with decisions that are the product of strategic leaders' preconceived ideas and attitudes, and operational environment volatility rather than the true resourcing needs of the forces. Making fixes to the quality and specificity of data provided into the process and refocusing it more on what comes out than what is reported upward. The Budgeting phase is simply the restatement of the decisions made in the Programming phase and will self-correct as the Programming phase is adjusted. For these reasons, this paper will not invest any further effort on recommending changes or improvements to these phases.
Execution
The comprehensive analysis performed leading up to the release of the PB answers the following questions according to OSD:
• Does the budget reflect the SecDef's and the President's priorities?
• Does it support the Administration's policies and initiatives?
• Does it appropriately reflect legislative direction that may have been included in DoD and Military Construction Appropriation Acts, the Defense Authorization Act, and the Intelligence Authorization Act for the current fiscal year?
• Does it reflect earlier guidance, for example, the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) and planning guidance?
• Are the programs funded in a manner that is consistent with legal limitations and financial policy guidance?
• Are the programs appropriately priced, based on sound estimating and cost principles, and executable as proposed?
• Can the programs and the budget estimates be justified to the Congress? 54 As postulated in the premise of this paper and evidenced by the OSD statement and analysis questions outlined above, the review and performance measurement processes imbedded in PPBE and implemented as a result of it are intended to focus upward on progress, performance, or execution as it pertains to the distribution and allocation of funds to programs, policies, strategies, and capabilities articulated to OSD, OMB, and Congress. It does not focus downward on how effectively and efficiently the funds were distributed to meet the true needs, requirements, or capabilities of the forces not specifically captured in the "big picture" programs outlined in the program and budget documents.
The Army Force Management School substantiates this claim in its DoD PPBE 2006 Executive Primer by stating:
It is only in the execution of the approved and resourced programs that we can evaluate the work that has gone into the earlier three stages of the process or simply stated-did we get the results we expected and for which we paid?...We have to make certain that we get the best outputthe most progress towards our stated goals-for the resources that the process makes available…We have, in the past, transferred responsibility to the field commanders for execution. We have to look at program execution in terms of the program outputs and not simply as the accounting for funds obligated and expended through the finance system. 55 The Aldridge Study found that the problems during this phase were that it focused on meeting execution guidelines set forth in financial management regulations, it was very complicated and drawn out, it didn't consider the toll on people, and data derived from this phase did not benefit the decisions made by the leadership. Since this study was published in 2004, PPBE changes have been implemented to address the previously stated problems to some degree, but this implementation did not arrest the over-arching problem of not knowing the true cost of resourcing the force in the categories and quantities spent for whom and by whom-it continues to look upwards. 56 PPBE problems as articulated by functional experts, resource management professionals, and end users or recipients of the resources allocated by the cyclic processing of PPBE are: the process sets a baseline which is not always representative of current funding situations and the system is not designed to detect the disconnects or require full-disclosure of the Services and Commands; it does not capture requirements or funding needs the same as they are spent which requires them to be re-categorized once received; funding received is most often less than required and arrives without guidance on closing the capability gaps; and the IPL list is an exercise in futility and normally does not result in any tangible benefits for the organization. Functional managers contend that too little attention is focused on execution and when addressed, the focus is misplaced. Paparone agrees and says "…deemphasize the "ppb" in PPBE and be attentive…to executing…" The Report must describe the most significant regional threats to US national interests and security as well as the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges. After describing the security environment in which military forces will operate, the NMS Report must specify the "ends," "ways," and "means" of the strategy. US national military objectives are the "ends," describing what the Armed Forces are expected to accomplish. The NMS report describes the relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment, regional, and international threats. Strategic and operational concepts are the "ways" of the strategy and describe how the Armed Forces conduct military operations to accomplish the specified military objectives. Finally, the NMS report must describe the adequacy of capabilities-the "means"-required to achieve objectives within an acceptable level of military and strategic risk 16 Ibid. Report -is an authoritative source of defense strategy built around the concept of shifting to a "capabilitiesbased" approach to defense. While we cannot know with confidence what nation, group of nations, or non-state actor might pose a threat to US vital interests or those of our allies and friends in the future, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might employ to coerce neighbors, deter the US from acting, or attack the US or its deployed forces. 21 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, "PPBE -Planning." Strategic Planning Guidance -is one of the three elements in the Joint Capabilities Development process and one of the five documents used in the Planning process, the SPG is issued early in the Planning process to provide overall policy and strategy guidance to be used in developing the defense program. It provides DoD Components with direction on defense policy, strategy, force and resource planning, and fiscal matters for use in developing their POMs. 22 Ibid. Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) -is the final document of the Planning process. JPG is issued in On-(even-numbered) years by OSD, and contains fiscally constrained programmatic guidance and performance measures. JPG drives the development of the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). In Offyears (odd-numbered years), Strategic Planning Guidance and Joint Planning Guidance are not expected to introduce major changes to the defense program, except as directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. A primary purpose of the Off-Budget year is to evaluate the execution of the planning goals and strategy contained in SPG and JPG, and to make adjustments as necessary. 23 Ibid. 24 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, "PPBE -Programming," linked from The OSD Center Home Page available from www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/ budget/ progphase.htm; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008. Program Objective Memoranda (POM) -is formulated and submitted in even-numbered On-years contain recommended programming and resource allocations. The POM includes an analysis of missions, objectives, alternative methods to accomplish objectives, and allocation of resources. With the implementation of a two-year budget cycle, a new document, the Program Change Proposal (PCP)-was introduced into the budgeting process to address urgent matters that need action during the Off-year. The services and defense agencies use the POM process in the evennumbered On-years. In addition to the current budget year, the POM is a seven-year plan that is organized within program categories, such as conventional forces or special operations; and by type of resource, such as funding or manpower. The program provides for four years beyond the budget year for cost and manpower, and seven years beyond the budget year for forces. 25 Ibid. Program Change Proposals (PCP) -are used in odd-numbered Off-Budget years, instead of POM, to request changes to the baseline budget set forth in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The expectation is that there will be few changes to that baseline and that only urgent issues will be addressed. All other items are deferred to the following year for consideration during the full-scale planning and programming process. In addition, each PCP must net to zero, meaning that proposed increases to programs must be offset by proposed program decreases 26 Ibid. Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) -is the document where POM review results are documented and signed by the SecDef or Dep SecDef (Each service receives a separate PDM). The PDM is the final document of the Programming process and contains decisions of the SecDef regarding programs and resources. 27 Ibid. 28 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, "PPBE -Budgeting." Budget Estimate Submission (BES) -is issued during the even-numbered On-Budget years, contains recommended budget estimates based on aggregated inputs from operational organizations and field Activities. The BES is the primary document used by the services and defense agencies to submit budget estimates. Each budget estimate is based on the programs and fiscal guidance contained in the POM; and includes the prior, current, and two budget fiscal years. For example, the FY06 Budget Submission includes data from FY04, FY05, FY06, and FY07. The FY07 Budget Submission will include data from FY05, FY06, and FY07. Data for the four years beyond the budget year is derived from the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). In even-numbered years On-Budget years, the Defense Components conduct a detailed budget development process. Program managers develop their own estimates within budgetary constraints from Headquarters and prepare their BES documents. Their estimates undergo a significant amount of scrutiny, which may result in the realignment of resources within the Agency or Department prior to submission of their budget to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Once the budgets are developed, they are submitted to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) for review. With the implementation of a two-year budget cycle, the Budget Change Proposal (BCP) document was introduced into the budgeting process to address fact-of-life changes and urgent matters that need action during the odd-numbered OffBudget year. 29 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, "PPBE -Programming." Budget Change Proposals (BCP) -are issued during odd-numbered Off-Budget years to request budget changes to the baseline program. In odd-numbered Off-Budget years, DoD Components prepare and submit Budget Change Proposals (BCP) instead of Budget Estimate Submissions. The Future Years Defense Program accompanying the preceding President's Budget (PB) is the baseline, and the expectation is that there will be little change. Fact-of-life changes that may be addressed by a Budget Change Proposal include cost increases, schedule delays, workload changes, and changes resulting from congressional action. Similar to the Program Change Proposal, the Budget Change Proposal must net to zero; that is, proposed budget increases must be offset by proposed budget decreases in the aggregate for each DoD Component. 30 Ibid. Performance Measures-with the evolution of PPBS to PPBE and the increased emphasis on the appropriate allocation of resources and proper execution of the budget, are a primary aspect of preparing budget estimates is the inclusion of performance metrics. Whether existing or needing to be developed, metrics are intended to measure the performance that is most relevant to a particular functional area and form the basis of the analytical underpinning to determine whether appropriate allocations of resources exist in current budgets. Stemming from DoD's increased focus on program performance and results, the budget execution review conducted in odd-numbered Off-Budget years allows DoD to assess current and previous resource allocations and determine whether DoD achieved its planned performance goals. To the extent that an existing program is failing to meet its goals, recommendations may be made to replace it with alternative solutions or to adjust funding to correct resource imbalances. OUSD(C) uses metrics that DoD Components submit as part of their budgets to make informed resource allocation decisions. 31 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, "PPBE -Budgeting," linked from The OSD iCenter web site, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/ budget/budgphase.htm; Internet; accessed 16 January 2008. Program Budget Decisions (PBD) -are a budget decision document issued by OSD and OMB during the joint review of the service and defense agency budget submissions. The detailed OSD budget review supports the development of resource alternatives that are articulated in a series of Program Budget Decisions (PBD). Program Budget Decisions are coordinated with all of the stakeholders on a particular issue. Through this review process, all perspectives-including those of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Service Secretaries, and OMB-are considered as an integral part of the decision-making process. In his deliberations, the Deputy Secretary of Defense considers the PBD and, also the responses prepared by all interested parties. The PBD review also known as the Fall Review, the budget review addresses two years in the even-numbered On-Budget year review and one year in the odd-numbered Off-Budget year review. During the review, OSD and OMB focus on areas of interest to the Administration and assess the overall Department budget on pricing, reasonableness, and ability to be executed. Their independent analysis forms the starting point for the fiscal guidance that is ultimately provided to DoD in the form of "pass-back" guidance, which usually includes the Administration's determinations on inflation, pay changes, the overall top-line and any special interest items. Concurrent with the review process, Program Budget Decision (PBD) documents are recorded into the Comptroller's Information System and the current status of the budget review becomes available as needed. Once decisions have been made on any issues identified by the Comptroller or OMB, the Defense Components are given an opportunity to resolve the issues with OUSD(C) as an out-of-court settlement or, subsequently, to appeal directly to the Secretary of Defense. Major Budget Issues (MBI) sessions are generally held in mid-December. Subsequent to MBI sessions, the Secretary may meet with the President to resolve any significant issues between the Department's required program and the approved top-line provided by OMB. Following the final decisions, the Comptroller integrates all of the changes and prepares the President's budget submission. The Comptroller electronically transmits summary budget data to OMB in early January with supporting documentation prepared by the Components. The summary budget data are standard for all of the federal agencies. However, documentation to support the Defense budget is based on standing agreements, legislative requirements, and discussions between DoD, OMB, and the congressional oversight committees. The Comptroller staff reviews all supporting documentation to ensure that it follows these agreements, properly reflects the Secretary's direction and decisions, and adequately justifies the requested resources. 57 Paparone, "Resourcing the Force in the Midst of Complexity: The Need to Deflate the 'ppb' in PPBE."
